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CASE SUMMARIES 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
ALAMEDA BOOKS v. CITY OF LOS 
ANGELES 
222 F.3D 719 (9TH eIR. 2000) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects freedom of speech.1 Courts categorize government re-
strictions of speech as either content based or content neu-
tral. 2 Content-based regulations restrict speech because of the 
specific idea or message conveyed.3 Because content-based 
regulations greatly restrain a person's right to free speech, 
they must serve a compelling government interest and be nar-
1 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances." See U.S. CONST. amend I. 
2 See generally, ERWlN CHEMERlNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw PRlNCIPLES AND POLl· 
CIES § 12.1.2 (1997). 
3 This standard is known as strict scrutiny. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 US 622-643 (1994). "As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish 
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed 
are content-based." Id. In Turner, the United States Supreme Court found that a fed-
eral law requiring cable companies to carry local broadcast stations was content neu-
tral because the companies were required to include all stations regardless of their 
programming. See id. at 643-644. 
91 
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rowly tailored to accomplish that interest.4 Content-neutral 
regulations, on the other hand, regulate conduct that indi-
rectly impacts speech.5 In order to pass muster, content-
neutral regulations must advance a significant state interest 
unrelated to the suppression of speech and not substantially 
burden more speech than necessary to further that interest.6 
Content-neutral restrictions often regulate the time, place, 
and manner of protected speech.7 Zoning ordinances enacted 
to limit the time, place, and manner for certain categories of 
speech are therefore generally characterized as content-
neutral restrictions.s In determining the validity of zoning 
regulations that restrict adult entertainment, the courts apply 
the intermediate scrutiny standard.9 In Alameda Books v. City 
of Los Angeles,lO (hereinafter, "City") the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether a Los Angeles zoning ordinance 
regulating adult businesses constituted a legitimate content-
neutral regulation. ll 
• See id. at 642-643. The standard that requires a law to be narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest is known as strict scrutiny. See id. Courts 
use the terms "significant" or "important" state interest interchangeably. See gener-
ally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.1.2. 
6 See Turner, 512 US at 642-643. 
6 This standard is known as intermediate scrutiny. See id. 
7 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that a New York City ordinance imposing volume re-
strictions on rock concerts to be performed on Central Park was a content-neutral 
zoning regulation unrelated to the suppression of speech. See id. at 791. 
8 A zoning regulation is a legislation dividing a city or county into areas for the 
purpose of limiting the use to which the land may be put, minimum size of lots, 
building types, etc. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
9 See United States v. 0' Brien, 319 U.S. 367, (1968), Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non Violence, 468 U.S. 288, (1984), Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781 (1989). 
10 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000). The appeal from the United State District Court 
for the Central District of California was argued and submitted on February 8, 2000 
before Circuit Judge Robert Boochever, Circuit Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, and 
Circuit Judge Sidney R. Thomas. See id. The decision was filed on July 27, 2000. Cir-
cuit Court Judge Michael Daly Hawkins authored the opinion. See id. A motion for 
rehearing was denied on August 28, 2000. See id. 
11 See id. at 720. 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Alameda Books v. City of Los Angeles,12 the City of Los 
Angeles (hereinafter "City") enacted Los Angeles Municipal 
Code Section 12.70 on July 28, 1978, to ban adult businesses 
located within 1,000 feet of another adult business or within 
500 feet of a church, school, or public park in the city of Los 
Angeles.13 The City adopted Section 12.70 after a comprehen-
sive study14 conducted in 1977 revealed a positive correlation 
between concentrations of adult businesses and increases in 
crime. 15 
In 1983, the City amended section 12.70(C) to ban so-
called "multiple use" adult businesses,16 as defined by Section 
12.70(B)Y As amended, section 12.70(C) outlawed two or 
more adult businesses located in the same building.1s In addi-
tion, the amendments modified the definition of "adult en-
tertainment business" to specifically categorize an "adult 
12 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000). 
13 See id. at 720. Section 12.70(C) provides that "No person shall cause or permit 
the establishment, substantial enlargement or transfer of ownership on an Adult 
Arcade, Adult Bookstore, Adult Cabaret, Adult Motel, Adult Motion Picture Theater, 
Adult Theater, Massage Parlor or Sexual Encounter Establishment within 1,000 feet 
of another such business or within 500 feet of any religious institution, school, or 
public park, within the City of Los Angeles." See L.A.M.C. § 12.70(C) (1977). 
14 In June, 1977, the City's Planning Department Commissions conducted a com-
prehensive study entitled "Study of the Effect of Adult Entertainment Establish-
ments in the City of Los Angeles" to assess the negative secondary effects of adult 
businesses on the surrounding community. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Ala· 
meda Books, 222 F.3d 719 (No. 98-56200). 
15 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 720. The study revealed increases in prostitu-
tion, robberies, assaults and thefts. See id. The Study also indicated that, although 
there was "some basis to conclude" that adult businesses adversely impacted property 
values in the surrounding neighborhoods, the concentration of adult businesses was 
not the primary cause of this phenomenon. See id. n.l. 
16 The amended version provides that "NO person shall cause or permit the es-
tablishment or maintenance of more than one adult entertainment business in the 
same building, structure, or portion thereof, [ ... ]" See L.A.M.C. § 12.70(C) (1983). 
17 L.A.M.C. § 12.70 (B), as amended, stated: "'Adult Entertainment Business'-
Adult Arcade, Adult Bookstore, Adult Cabaret, Adult Motel, Adult Motion Picture 
Theater, Adult Theater, Massage Parlor, or Sexual Encounter Establishment, ... , 
and each shall constitute a separate adult entertainment business even if operated in 
conjunction with another adult entertainment business at the same establishment." 
See id. 
18 See id. 
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bookstore"19 and an· "adult arcade"20 as separate adult en-
tertainment businesses, even if operated together or in con-
junction with another adult entertainment business at the 
same location.21 
Appellees Alameda Books, Inc. (hereinafter, "Alameda") 
and Highland Books, Inc., (hereinafter, "Highland"), operated 
adult businesses within the City of Los Angeles. 22 Neither 
business was located within 1,000 feet of another adult busi-
ness or within 500 feet of any religious institution, school, or 
public park.23 Both Alameda and Highland rented and sold 
sexually explicit products.24 Additionally, both establishments 
offered two types of booths for videotape viewing.25 Each store 
had only one entrance door and one employee supervising the 
entire location.26 Furthermore, appellees were the sole owners 
of their respective businesses, and bookstore revenue was not 
distinguished from video booth revenue except for internal ac-
counting purposes.27 
On March 15, 1995, a City building inspector alleged that 
Alameda operated both an adult bookstore and an adult 
19 Section 12.70(B)(2) defines an adult bookstore as: "An establishment which has 
a substantial portion of its-stock-in-trade and offers for sale for any form of consider-
ation any or more of the following: (a) Books, magazines, periodicals or other printed 
matter, or photographs, films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides or other visual 
representation which are characterized by an emphasis of "specified sexual activities" 
or "specified anatomical areas"; or (b) Instruments, devices, paraphernalia which are 
deigned for use in connection with "specified anatomical areas." See L.A.M.C. § 
12.70(B)(2). 
20 Section 12.70(B)(1) defines an "adult arcade" as: "An establishment where, for 
any form of consideration, one or more motion pictures, slide projectors or. similar 
machines, for viewing by five or fewer persons each, are used to show films, motion 
pictures, video cassettes, slides or other photographic reproductions which are charac-
terized by an emphasis upon the depiction or description of "specified sexual activi-
ties" or "specified anatomical areas." See L.A.M.C.§ 12.70(B)(1) (1983). 
21 See L.A.M.C. § 12.70(C). 
22 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 720. 
23 See id. at 721. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. Customers used preview booths to watch tapes that could be rented or 
purchased in the store. See id. Multi-channel viewing booths allowed patrons to 
watch movies on the premises. See id. The bookstores and the two types of booths 
were located in the same commercial space within the same building. See Alameda 
Books, 222 F.3d at 721. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
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arcade in the same building in violation of Section 12.70(c).28 
Alameda, joined by Highland, brought suit against the City 
seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 12.70(C) was un-
constitutional, and an injunction to enjoin its enforcement 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983.29 Both the City and the bookstores 
moved for summary judgment30 on First Amendment 
grounds.31 The City maintained that the ordinance was consti-
tutional because it served the important government interest 
of preventing the negative secondary effects associated with 
adult businesses.32 Alameda and Highland argued that the 
zoning regulation violated the First Amendment because it re-
stricted their freedom of speech.33 
The District Court for the Central District of California 
initially denied both summary judgment motions on the First 
Amendment issue because the court determined that the ap-
pellants stated "a genuine issue of fact as to whether appel-
[d. 
28 See id. 
29 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that 
"[e]very person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and the laws, shall be liable t.o the person in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress, 
except in any other action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omis-
sion taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was un-
available. For the purposes of this section, any act of Congress applicable ex-
clusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia." 
30 A motion for summary judgment will be granted when "there is no genuine is-
sue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." See FED. R. ClY. FRoc. 56. 
31 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Alameda and Highland argued that 
the ordinance, as applied to them, infringed upon their First Amendment right to 
free speech because Los Angeles failed to demonstrate that the ordinance served the 
important government interest of curbing the negative secondary effects caused by 
adult businesses. See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 721. In contrast, the City claimed 
that the enforcement of the regulation against the plaintiffs did not violate the Con-
stitution because it was serving the important governmental interest of combating 
the deleterious secondary effects associated with adult businesses. See id. 
32 See id at 721. 
33 See id. 
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lees' bookstore and arcade components were separate busi-
nesses" for purposes of the Los Angeles ordinance.34 Alameda 
and Highland subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 
of the First Amendment portion of the District Court's order 
denying summary judgment.35 On June 2, 1998, the court va-
cated its prior order and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Alameda and Highland finding that the ordinance was un-
constitutional. 36 The court then issued a permanent injunction 
enjoining the City's enforcement of the ordinance against Ala-
meda and Highland.37 The City appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.3s 
III. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
A. DE Novo REVIEW39 OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In reviewing the lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Alameda and Highland, the Ninth Circuit in 
Alameda Books v. City of Los Angeles40 addressed whether 
there a genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the 
district court correctly applied the substantive law.41 Although 
the court acknowledged that Los Angeles had an important 
interest in curbing the harmful secondary effects associated 
with a "concentration of adult businesses," it affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment.42 The court reasoned 
that the City did not meet its burden to show that it reasona-
bly relied on conclusive evidence in support of the enactment 
of the zoning ordinance.43 
34 See id. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
35 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 721. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 De novo review is an appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court's 
record, but does not give deference to the lower court's rulings and reasoning. See 
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
40 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000). 
41 See id. at 722. In affirming summary judgment in favor of Alameda and High-
land, the Ninth Circuit noted that although the district court analyzed the Los Ange-
les ordinance in a slightly different manner, the lower court ruling was nonetheless 
correct. See id. 
42 See id. at 724. 
43 See id. 
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B. THE COLACURCIO STANDARD CONTROLS 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that two different formula-
tions of the Renton standard have evolved from Tollis v. City 
and County of San Bernardino44 and Colacurcio v. City of 
Kent. 45 In an attempt to dispel the confusion created by these 
two different tests, the court preferred the Colacurcio ap-
proach to analyze content-neutral regulations of speech.46 
The Ninth Circuit first determined that Section 12.70(C) 
constituted a time, place, and manner regulation affecting 
adult establishments.47 The court then summarily dismissed 
Colacurcio's first inquiry into the purpose of the ordinance, 
stating that even if it were content neutral, it would fail to 
satisfy the second Colacurcio requirement that the regulation 
« See 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987). 
45 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 720, 722·725. Under Colacurcio, a city might 
impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, provided that the restrictions 
are: (1) content neutral; 2) narrowly tailored to serve an important interest; and (3) 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d 
545, 551. Under Tollis, a court must inquire: (1) whether an ordinance is a time, 
place, and manner regulation; (2) if so, whether it is content-neutral or content-
based; and (3) if content-neutral, whether it is designed to serve a significant state 
interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. See 
Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1332. 
46 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 722-723. The court noted that the two tests 
have no substantive difference since they yield the same result. See id. Nonetheless, 
the Ninth Circuit favored Colacurcio. "Colacurcio, however, better formulates the 
test. First, the third step of Tollis incorporates two distinct inquiries, which are more 
properly separated for both conceptual and practical reasons in Colacurcio. Addition-
ally, Tollis needlessly establishes the time, place or manner inquiry as a distinct step. 
Time, place or manner is an objective description of a regulation (or one proffered by 
the enacting legislative body); it is not a talismanic incantation affording the ordi-
nance a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny. To the contrary, the question the courts 
must ask is whether the time, place or manner regulation is content-neutral. The Su-
preme Court recognized as much in Ward when it excluded a time, place or manner 
analysis, which it had included in Renton, from its discussion. For the sake of clarity 
and consistency in future opinions, and because we believe the Colacurcio formula-
tion is more aptly constructed, we will utilize it here." [d. The Ninth Circuit also 
noted that in Colacurcio the court held that the regulation must serve a "significant" 
state interest. See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d 723 n.3. See also Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 
551. In addition, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Tollis did not explicitly include 
the narrow tailoring requirement as part of its third step. See Alameda Books, 222 
F.3d at 723 n.4. See also Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1333. 
47 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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must promote a significant state interest.48 
Colacurcio's second prong required the government to 
show that the zoning ordinance furthers a significant state in-
terest. 49 The court acknowledged that while the City had a 
substantial interest in reducing crime, the evidence addressed 
the concentration of adult businesses and indicated no corre-
lation between a single adult business, such as Alameda and 
Highland, and increased crime. 50 
Although the City conceded that the 1977 study at as-
sessed the deleterious secondary effects of a "concentration" of 
adult businesses, it nonetheless asserted that the study sup-
ported its inclusion of the combination arcadelbookstore under 
section 12.70(C).51 Citing Tollis and Renton, the Ninth Circuit 
reiterated that the government must show that it relied on 
evidence permitting a reasonable inference that without the 
regulation adult businesses would produce harmful secondary 
effects. 52 The court found that the facts in this case were anal-
48 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 723. The second step considers whether a sub-
stantial governmental interest exists. See id. See also Acorn Investments, Inc. v. City 
of Seattle, 997 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding unconstitutional under Renton a 
city licensing fee for specific types of adult theaters because the City failed to prove 
that these theaters were responsible for fostering the alleged negative secondary ef-
fects); and Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC ("Turner II"), 520 U.S. 180, 211 
(1997) (holding that in reviewing content-neutral regulations burdening speech under 
an intermediate scrutiny standard, the question for the courts is "whether the legis-
lative inclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence before the leg-
islative body."). 
49 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 723. See also Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551. 
50 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 724-726. Therefore, the court found that Sec-
tion 12.70(C) did not serve this significant state interest. See id. The 1977 study, 
which the city relied on as the basis for the regulation, assessed the negative secon-
dary effects of a concentration of adult businesses, not the impact of a single adult 
establishment, such as Alameda or Highland. See id. The study treated an establish-
ment containing both an arcade and a bookstore as a single business. See id. Accord-
ing to the study, negative secondary effects arise when an adult business is in close 
proximity to other adult businesses. See id. Los Angeles produced no evidence that a 
single adult establishment causes the same harmful secondary effects caused by a 
"concentration" of adult businesses, even if the establishment contains several differ-
ent forms of adult entertainment under one roof. See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 
724-726. 
51 See id at 724-725. Los Angeles asserted that the 1977 study provided a suffi-
cient basis to allow it constitutionally proscribe the combination adult arcadelbook-
store under Section 12.70(C). See id. 
52 See id. at 725. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss1/6
2001] FIRST AMENDMENT 99 
ogous to Tollis. 53 The City of Los Angeles faIled to present any 
findings that a combination bookstore/arcade produces the 
same negatives effects, namely increased crime, as a "concen-
tration" of adult businesses.54 
Los Angeles then argued that, since Renton allowed the 
city to rely on studies conducted by other cities or counties 
that linked adult businesses to increased crime in the neigh-
borhood, the 1977 study merited similar deference. 55 The 
Ninth Circuit emphasized the City still retained the burden to 
prove that its own 1977 study was pertinent to the enactment 
of the code amendment.56 Therefore, since the 1977 study only 
addressed the effects of a "concentration" of adult businesses 
on the surrounding community rather than those of a single 
adult business, the Ninth Circuit held that Los Angeles could 
not show that the ordinance was designed to accomplish the 
government's goals of reducing crime and preserving the qual-
ity of the neighborhoods.57 
63 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 725. In Tollis, an adult business offering both 
movies and live entertainment challenged the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance 
banning adult businesses within 1,000 feet from residential areas, churches, schools, 
parks or playgrounds. See Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1331, 1332. The Ninth Circuit upheld 
the regulation because the County failed to introduce any evidence that adult busi-
nesses caused the harmful secondary effects the regulation sought to prevent. See id. 
at 1333. 
54 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 726. Compare Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 
Inc., 475 US. 41, 51-52 (1985) where the United States Supreme Court held that a 
city need not conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already 
gathered by other cities, as long as the evidence relied upon is reasonably believed to 
be relevant to problem the City is seeking to address. See id. 
55 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 725. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
that courts should refrain from second-guessing the decisions of legislative bodies, 
such deference is not unbounded. See id. at 725. Compare Renton, 475 US. at 52 
quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 US. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
"Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with so-
lutions to admittedly serious problems." [d. 
56 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 725-726. A city can rely on foreign studies; 
however, this does not relieve the city from the obligation of demonstrating that the 
study must be reasonably believed to be relevant the problem the city seeks to ad-
dress. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551 (quoting Renton, 475 US. at 51-52). 
57 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 724. The court further explained that Los An-
geles could not rely on the United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Erie v. 
Pap's A.M., 529 US. 277 (2000). See id. at 726 n.7. In City of Erie, the Court upheld 
a ban on nude dancing because nude dancing at the establishment in question was of 
same character as adult entertainment at issue in prior Supreme Court's opinions. 
9
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C. DECISIONS IN OTHER CIRCUITS 
The Ninth Circuit drew distinctions between similar cases 
in other circuits. 58 The Ninth Circuit first distinguished Ala-
meda Books from ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester,59 
where the Eighth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of an 
adult business zoning ordinance prohibiting on-premise view-
ing of adult movies or tapes.60 There, the City of Rochester re-
lied on foreign studies as evidence of negative secondary ef-
fects produced by adult businesses.61 Nevertheless, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that the Los Angeles' ordinance would still 
fail under the Eighth Circuit analysis because Los Angeles 
1977 study did not examine the effects of single adult busi-
nesses; rather, it focused only on a "concentration" of adult 
businesses.62 
The Ninth Circuit then distinguished Alameda Books 
from Mitchell v. Comm'n on Adult Entertainment Est.,63 where 
the Third Circuit held that the state need only show that 
adult businesses were a "class cause"64 of harmful secondary 
See id. at 296. Thus, it was reasonable for the city to conclude that such nude danc-
ing was likely to produce same secondary effects. See id. at 296. To justify ordinance 
regulating nude dancing, the city could reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation 
set forth in previous Supreme Court opinions to effect that secondary effects were 
caused by the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given 
neighborhood. See id. at 297. The Court thus ruled that the city was, therefore, not 
required to develop specific evidentiary record supporting ordinance. See id. 
68 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 727-728. 
69 See 25 F.3d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1994) (where the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of an adult business zoning ordinance based on foreign studies). 
60 See id. at 1419. 
61 See id. at 1417. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the city need not prove that the 
adult business in question would have caused the same hanDful effects on its neigh-
borhoods as the adult businesses examined in other jurisdictions. See id. at 1418. The 
court held that as long as the city ordinance affected only those categories of busi-
nesses reasonably believed to produce some of the deleterious secondary, the City of 
Rochester had to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions 
to this problem. See id. 
62 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 727. 
63 10 F.3d 123, 138 (3d Cir 1993). 
64 It should be noted that the Third Circuit did not defined the terms "a class 
cause". However, this author opines that the court's terminology entails that a mu-
nicipality need not prove that a particular adult business caused the negative secon-
dary effects on the surrounding neighborhood. Rather, the Third Circuit seems to in-
dicate that a single business by virtue of belonging to the category of adult 
10
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effects in residential neighborhoods.65 The Third Circuit did 
not find that the state needed to prove the operation of its. 
businesses directly contributed to the negative secondary ef-
fects in order to impose these regulations.66 
Los Angeles attempted to analogize Mitchell to justify the 
application of Section 12.70(C) against Alameda and High-
land.67 The Ninth Circuit, however, interpreted the Mitchell 
holding to address the issue of whether the regulation was 
narrowly tailored, not whether the evidence produced could 
reasonably justify the regulation as serving an important gov-
ernmental interest.68 The court then indicated that merely re-
quiring a showing that adult businesses were a "class cause" 
of harmful effects would not even meet the Tollis requirement 
that the regulation be based upon evidence permitting a rea-
sonable inference that, absent such restrictions, adult busi-
nesses would produce harmful secondary effects.69 
The City also argued that the Fourth Circuit in Hart 
Book Stores70 upheld an ordinance substantially similar to 
Section 12.70(C).71 The Ninth Circuit noted that Hart had 
been decided before Renton.72 Consequently, Hart would not 
entertainment is presumed to produce negative secondary effects. 
65 See Mitchell, 10 F.3d. at 138. The adult bookstore challenging the restrictions, 
which included limited hours of operation and a ban on closed viewing booths, argued 
that, since it was not located near residential areas, it could not produce the same 
deleterious effects on the surrounding neighborhoods as other adult businesses in ur-
ban settings. See id. at 127-129. Adult Books pointed out that the business was lo-
cated two miles away from any residential area on three sides and was separated 
from the residential area on its fourth side by an eight-lane freeway with no pedes-
trian crosswalks. See id. 
66 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 727. Los Angeles urged the court to follow 
and rule that since ·Alameda and Highland were adult businesses likely to produce 
harmful secondary effects, they were subject to Section 12.70(C). See id. 
67 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 726. 
68 See id. 
69 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 727. 
70 See 612 F.2d 821 at 828. 
71 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 727. The North Carolina law in Hart prohib-
ited two or more adult businesses from occupying the same bUilding. Adult book-
stores and adult arcades where defined as separate establishments in the statute. See 
Hart, 612 F.2d at 823. In contrast, the Los Angeles ordinance did not define book-
stores and arcades as separate businesses at the time of the ·1977 study. See L.A.M.C. 
12.70(C) 
72 See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 727-728. 
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likely withstand constitutional scrutiny today.73 Furthermore, 
since the City ordinance only addressed the harmful secon-
dary effects on the neighborhoods outside a "concentration" of 
adult businesses, and not inside or within its walls, the Ninth 
Circuit found the comparison with Hart inapplicable to Ala-
meda Books.74 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that Section 
12.70(c) was unconstitutional as applied to Alameda and 
Highland, and affirmed the district court's injunction against 
enforcement of the ordinance.75 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The United States Supreme Court in Renton v. Playtime 
Theaters, Inc.,76 established an attainable burden on a munici-
pality for the enactment of zoning ordinances that regulate 
adult businesses.77 The Ninth Circuit requirement that the 
City of Los Angeles produce a new study to demonstrate 
harmful secondary effects from an adult arcade and an adult . 
bookstore housed under one roof appears contrary to Renton, 
as it raises the necessary evidence threshold for the enact-
ment of adult zoning regulations.78 Most courts tend to grant 
considerable deference to legislative bodies, especially in the 
presence of a significant state interest. 79 In contrast, the 
Ninth Circuit was unduly technical in requiring Los Angeles 
73 See id. at 728. Moreover, the evidence relied upon in Hart consisted of a report 
on health conditions inside video viewing booths. See Hart, 612 F.2d at 828-829 n.9. 
Furthermore, Hart did not require proof that adult bookstores containing movie-
viewing booths produced greater harmful secondary effects as compared to the com-
bined secondary effects of two separate stores. See id. The only evidence of deleteri-
ous secondary effects mentioned in Hart was a brief reference to an inspection on 
some arcade booths within certain adult bookstores that revealed unsanitary condi-
tions. See id. The Ninth Circuit then pointed out that such evidence would be insuffi-
cient to meet Tollis' reasonable inference requirement because the report pertained 
only to the conditions inside the adult establishments, not to its effects on its sur-
rounding areas. See Alameda Books, 222 F.3d at 728. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 727. 
76 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
77 See text accompanying note 56. 
78 See Alameda Books v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000). 
79 See id. at 724. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the fact that the City of Los 
Angeles had a significant state interest in curtailing the harmful secondary effects 
adult businesses produced. See id. 
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to present a particularized report detailing the deleterious 
secondary effects that an adult arcadelbookstore combination 
may cause on the surrounding areas.80 
Other circuits that addressed the same issue have refused 
to support the proposition that the municipalities must con-
duct specific studies in support of the enactment of adult zon-
ing regulations.81 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Ala-
meda Books seemingly deviates from the intermediate 
scrutiny standard that the Renton Court proscribed and that 
most circuit courts follow. 
Municipalities, however, may circumvent the Alameda ev-
identiary requirement by presenting specific evidence assess-
ing the particular problem an ordinance attempts to solve. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit decision in Alameda Books cannot be 
regarded as a victory for adult expression in general. The ex-
isting municipal code section can be applied against those 
adult businesses in Los Angeles that constitute a "concentra-
tion" of adult businesses as assessed by the 1977 study. 
Katia Lazzara * 
80 See generally ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir. 
1994), Mitchell v. Comm'n on Adult Entertainment Est., 10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993), 
Hart Book Stores v. Edminsten, 612 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1979). 
81 The Tenth Circuit in Z.J. Gifts v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683 (10th Cir .. 1998), 
upheld a zoning ordinance which had been challenged by an adult bookstore owner 
on the ground that the evidence relied upon by the City Council did not conclusively 
prove that the plaintiff's business contributed to the deleterious secondary effects. 
See id. at 685. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the evidence had to support only the 
City's purpose in enacting the ordinance and that the regulation affected only those 
businesses that caused unwanted secondary effects. See id. at 689. In addition, the 
Second Circuit consistently upheld New a York City's adult business ordinance in 
Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 1998) and Hickerson v. City of 
New York, 146 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit ruled that, since the City 
had established a correlation between adult businesses and the negative secondary 
effects they produce, the ordinance met the evidentiary standard set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Renton. See Hickerson, 146 F.3d at 105-106. 
* J.D. candidate 2002. 
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